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ABSTRACT
Because of a number of financial and economic circumstances
leading up to the current decade, the sources and methods of
real estate finance have undergone a permanent change. As a
result, construction financing, one of the most important
types of real estate finance, has been forced to change as
well. Real estate developers have begun to seek alternative
sources and methods to finance their building construction
projects. This thesis discusses how this has come about,
and addresses some of the most significant new sources and
methods of construction finance of which developers have
recently made use. Included are FHA credit enhancement,
Wall Street capital in the form of debt and equity, REIT and
REOC finance, and joint venturing with various potential
project partners. This thesis implies that in many cases
the best current method of construction finance is a hybrid
of bank debt and joint venture equity.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Massood Samii
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
THESIS
"Real estate companies are going to resemble regular corporations."'
Alan Leventhal
The entire structure of the real estate capital market has
changed dramatically since 1986. Capital sources have
shifted vigorously from the private to the public sector.
The two most compelling bits of evidence of this shift have
been
1. the emergence of the CMBS, the commercial mortgage backed
security, a financial instrument almost unheard of in the
1980s but which now represents 25% of all debt originated
to finance commercial real estate and2
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1 "The Future of Real Estate Development," Boston, MA, November 18,
1997.
2 Chart from class notes, Real Estate Capital Markets, MIT, Professor
Timothy Riddiough.
2. the emergence of the REIT, a once ignored corporate
structure which now represents 4% of real estate assets
nationwide, growing rapidly'.
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Put simply, real estate finance instruments, once the
guarded holdings of large institutions, have become
available to the general public investor. The result - more
sophisticated underwriting techniques necessitated by public
ownership have forced the traditionally cryptic, jargon-
filled, nuanced, American real estate finance to operate now
on the more familiar principles of ordinary corporate
finance with less debt and more equity. This change in the
real estate capital markets has begun to gravely effect the
most hazardous tool of real estate finance: construction
3 Ibid.
financing. As this thesis will show, the sources and
methods of construction financing, like the rest of the
market for real estate finance, has begun to and will
continue to undergo a permanent structural change over the
next market cycle, leading to an altogether different cadre
of sources for this money. Under that pre-text, how can the
sponsors of construction projects, the real estate
developers, continue to acheive the same investment returns
that they acheived in the past? With some creative
accounting and a vertically integrated organization a
developer can successfully finance construction with help
from the federal, state or municipal government (eg. FHA),
from Wall Street firms via debt, equity or corporate
conversion (eg. REOC), or best of all, from a joint venture
partner such as a REIT.
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF CONSTRUCTION FINANCING?
Construction financing is a form of project finance,
specifically designed for the purposes of a building
construction project. There are many forms and sources of
project finance, but construction finance is unique and full
of nuances due to its intrinsic connection with real estate
finance. Generally, when a project sponsor attempts a real
estate development project, the sponsor requires immense
amounts of capital from sources other than his own balance
sheet. Chronologically, the developer may need any or all
of the following development stages of finance:
Type Of Finance Use of FinanceIn Development Chronological Order
All of these finance needs can be satisfied by a variety of
sources in many forms of debt and equity. This thesis will
focus on #4, construction finance.
THE INHERENT RISKS OF THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS
There are a number of risks which all parties to a
construction project must accept before financing is
established. The greatest of these risks is completion
risk. Will the builder finish the project? A number of
potential obstructions lay down the road of any building
project. For example, unforeseen subsurface conditions may
render the design not feasible, irresponsible sub-
contractors may walk away from the job or work more slowly
than anticipated, fluctuating material prices during the
construction period may throw the project off budget and
encourage the developer to halt any further progress. To
counter these risks, the financier will almost always
require the builder to post a surety bond of some type or
personally guarantee completion of the project.
The second greatest risk is "as-planned" completion risk,
that the project will be completed within budget and on
time. This risk, related to general completion risk, can
cause dreadful effects on project finance which will be
examined with respect to each of the various sources of
finance.
Another great risk that the financier takes is the risk of
refinance. The construction lender or investor is generally
the primary source of capital, and it expects its loan to be
"taken-out" or its equity to be redeemed once the
construction process has been completed. Naturally a
construction lender will require that a "take-out," or
permanent loan be arranged in advance of the first draw-down
of the construction loan, but what if the future lender
experiences financial problems in the meantime and upon
completion cannot afford to make the loan.
Of course the financier is also assuming the real estate
developer's specific risk. The success of a real estate
project is related to its location, its timing, and its
product. If the developer and financier have misjudged the
value of the location, have mistimed the real estate market,
or have built something which is inappropriate for the
above, the project will not yield the expected returns.
The financier is also assuming the general money market
risk. It may have loaned the money at a low interest rate
just before a rate hike, or it may have invested in a
project with a low internal rate of return only to notice
that blue chip companies on the stock market would
appreciate at twice that rate over the same period.
THE TRADITIONAL SOURCE OF CONSTRUCTION FINANCE: BANK DEBT
"Construction lending is the most hazardous legitimate way for a lender
to earn his money, as well as the most sophisticated form of real estate
finance."'4 Alvin Arnold
Risks Specific to Construction Debt 5
* The building under construction is the collateralized
security. A half completed building project is often
worth less than the vacant land on which it sits. In
case of loan default, the lender's chances of value
recovery in foreclosure are slim. Thus, the lender may
be forced to complete the project or fund the completion
of the project itself - very few lenders have any
capacity to build. Moreover, the lender's cost of
completing the unfinished margin of the project will
certainly be higher than that margin's pro-rata share of
the originally planned cost, and meanwhile, the interest
clock has been ticking away all the time.
* Mechanic's liens of unpaid or slighted contractors and
material suppliers, under the laws of many states, can
achieve priority or parity with the rights of the
construction lender's original mortgage lien.
* A loss of permanent financing due to construction
problems can constitute a serious problem for the
4 Construction and Development Financing, Alvin L. Arnold, Boston, WG&L,
1992.
construction lender. Difficulties during construction or
defaults by the sponsor can often release the permanent
lender from its obligation to "take-out" the construction
lender on completion, leaving the construction lender
holding a loan with no immediate source of repayment.
Further, the permanent lender may be released from its
obligation if the builder has not diligently followed
plans and specifications, or has not completed the
project quickly enough to meet the permanent lender's
commitment deadline.
* A loss of permanent financing due to real estate
marketing problems can also constitute a serious problem
for the construction lender. Often, permanent loan
commitments rely on a certain level of marketing success
of the project, such as a certain level of vacancy or a
total rent roll. If the project does not succeed, or
does not succeed quickly enough, the construction lender
may have to hold a nonrefundable loan on a bad project.
* A principal agent with an incongruous interest can pose
an extremely hazardous situation for the debt provider.
As discussed in the box above, many developers initiate
deals only because they can do so without putting up any
of their own capital. With nothing at stake personally,
they may have no interest in proceeding with a difficult
project and simply allow the lender to foreclose.
s Real Estate Development and Construction Financing, Charles Zalaznick,
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The nature of debt is such that is a money instrument with a
finite investment up-side and a potentially infinite
investment down-side. That is, the most a lender can earn
from a loan is the agreed upon interest rate; meanwhile,
under unfortunate circumstances, the lender may wind up
holding the title to something that is effectively worthless
as collateral. For these reasons, lenders will always
carefully examine the project's potential problems and
attempt to apply credit safeguards to the use of debt
instruments. Typically, a debt provider will need to know
many things about the project.
SThe experience of the borrower is often the most
important criteria of the lender in initiating the
process of assessing a construction loan. As we shall
see, most construction borrowers are "relationship"
clients of financial institutions which handle their
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see, most construction borrowers are "relationship"
clients of financial institutions which handle their
corporate finance and mortgage banking in general.
Construction loans can thus simply be commercial credit.
The borrower must have a track record of successful
projects and few, if any, bad loans.
* The financial condition of the borrower is important for
obvious reasons. Without a substantial balance sheet,
the developer will clearly be unable to afford his equity
input, cost-overruns, and the potential carrying cost of
the project before it becomes qualified for the take-out.
* The legal structure of the borrower is certainly
significant.
* The experience, reputation, and financial condition of
the contractor is significant to the lender in the case
that the borrower and contractor are different. At some
point in the value chain the party or parties to the
contract must obtain a surety bond or satisfactorily
guarantee completion.
* A historical market survey or study of the project helps
the bank determine the value of the project it might wind
up with if the borrower indeed defaults. This real
estate value determination is often the most important
factor in establishing what maximum amount of credit the
lender will extend to the borrower.
* The marketing plan, including pre-sales/pre-leasing is
also significant to the lender. The lender wishes to
know if the borrower has a competent sales strategy.
Also, if the borrower has pre-sold any interests he will
likely be eligible for credit enhancement, including more
favorable interest rates and a higher loan/value ratio.
* The amount and quality of the "take-out" financing can be
a non-starter for most construction lenders. Without a
qualified permanent financier in place, with reasonable
obligation constraints, few lenders will offer a
construction loan.
* The amount of equity invested by the borrower presents a
common problem for debt providers. As we shall see, the
issue of "developer's equity" is the genesis of many
principal agent problems which can develop over the
course of the loan.
* The preliminary construction budget, related to the
borrowers equity, is a document which is easily
manipulated to improve "developer's equity," and must be
carefully scrutinized by debt providers.
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE TRADITIONAL SOURCE OF CONSTRUCTION FINANCING?
"The real estate industry was permanently changed by the 10 year
drought."6 Christopher Jeffries, Chairman, Millenium Partners
Up until the 1990's in the United States, most financing for
construction projects was available in the form of debt
instruments from savings banks (eg. S&Ls, or Building and
Loans) or larger commercial banks. These institutions were
accustomed to providing sponsors with very large loans as a
percentage of project cost, at prevailing interest rates
only a couple of hundred basis points above the risk free
rate of interest. For the S&Ls this was a good business
because it was in compliance with the government regulations
which S&Ls needed to meet to maintain their FDIC/FSLIC
deposit insurance. By borrowing short at 3% (the interest
paid to depositors) and lending short at 8% (the interest
owed by construction borrowers), the banks could match the
terms of the obligations on their balance sheets.
Meanwhile, commercial banks, often had specialized, "Real
Estate" divisions, which maintained relationships with
client-developers, and made larger scale loans for
institutional size projects, unrestricted by federal
regulations. For a number of reasons however, these sources
of financing were not, in principle, perfectly equipped to
make construction loans.
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In the case of the S&Ls, the construction loan problem of
the 1980's was essentially caused by government regulatory
practices. In the 1970's, high inflation and volatile
interest rates due to an unstable economy were killing the
savings and loans. Indeed, while one year treasury bills
were yielding 7% (1970), S&Ls could offer no more than a 4%
interest rate on deposits. S&L net deposits floundered at
less than $5 billion. Over the next 20 years, the federal
government deregulated these financial institutions,
allowing them to offer market interest rates, easing charter
requirements, reducing capital reserve requirements,
allowing brokered deposits, etc.. Even as they allowed the
S&Ls to invest their deposits in riskier ways, the federal
government actually increased the deposit insurance
ceilings. As a result, the S&Ls had plenty of capital to go
invest in big, risky, real estate development ventures, with
no downside risk since the government had guaranteed the
depositors' accounts anyway. One real estate recession
later, virtually all of the S&Ls and B&Ls were insolvent as
a result of bad development loans, bailed out by the federal
government and gone from the American banking scene. The
federal government re-regulated lending (FIREA/FIDICIA) of
deposit-insured institutions, once again limiting brokered
15
6 Lecture given by Chris Jeffries, "The Future of Real Estate
Development," Boston, MA, November 18, 1997,
deposits, re-imposing restrictions, and increasing the
regulatory presence.'
As for the commercial banks, they too had serious problems
with their real estate loans in the 1980s. Commercial banks
exhibited a few serious errors in the way they made loans.
One such error was the backward-looking method of loan
analysts. Commercial bankers judged the value of real
estate projects on the basis of current and recent
historical rental rates for similar, existing assets. This
method could not account for the potential change in rental
rates due to the new market supply, nor could it account for
the inherently cyclical nature of real estate markets.
Another error was the herd mentality exhibited by loan
officers. Broad commitments by bank executives to allocate
large amounts of capital to high yield real estate
investments pressured loan officers to compete to make
loans. This competition for business caused lending at
extremely high loan:value ratios as well as long, standing
or in some cases, negative amortization periods. When the
market recession arrived, these institutions survived an
enormous number of loan defaults, work-outs, corporate
restructuring and consolidation to arrive in the 1990s with
little desire to resume real estate lending.'
7 From class notes, Real Estate Finance and Investment, MIT, Professor
Timothy Riddiough
8 Lecture given by Walter Mercer, Members Meeting of the MIT Center for
Real Estate, December 1997.
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The 1990's began with no S&Ls and no serious commercial
lenders to service old, surviving debts. As the owners of
heavily leveraged assets discovered that their mortgages
would soon be due, and that their traditional sources of
debt capital were gone or uninterested (notice the "credit
crunch" in the above chart), they began to seek alternative
sources of financing. Who would step in to fill the void?
Owners of real estate discovered a few new sources and
methods. There was money in the public market, so many
converted their debt obligations to equity and reorganized
as real estate investment trusts (REITs). As for the
private market, although commercial banks were uneager to
lend themselves, they, as well as many Wall Street firms,
were happy to underwrite "commercial mortgage backed
securities", and sell them off to public and institutional
clients, making the spread. Since, as was stated above,
' Chart from class notes, Real Estate Capital Markets, MIT, Professor
Timothy Riddiough.
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construction lending is often "relationship" lending, these
two sources of finance, the public investor and Wall Street,
have naturally begun to finance construction projects as
part of the whole client-service package. In addition to
these sources, developers may still obtain suitable
construction finance from some older sources with some
crafty book-keeping.
WHAT ARE THE COMMERCIAL BANKS DOING TODAY?
"There are so many places to go that can slice and dice, there's such a
demand for real estate syndication, the skim fees that we're making are
huge!" Jerry Ward, Managing Director, Real Estate Group, Bank Boston.1 0
Sources of Income of Some Major US Banks
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But what of the commercial banks? As was stated, while the
S&L's are now gone, commercial banks are still around, still
10 Lecture given by Jerry Ward, MD Real Estate Group, Bank Boston, MIT
Center for Real Estate, December 1997.
11 Data for charts from Bloomberg financial information service,
December 1997.
Fees
32%
Trading
4%
holding loans and some unfortunate real estate assets, still
performing some real estate client services. In the
aftermath of the recession of 1992, many commercial banks
found themselves at a crossroads. As the rules of the
federal Glass-Steigel act, which regulates the investments
of banks, have become blurred with the advent of financial
technology, many of these banks have begun to establish
themselves as international currency and derivatives traders
(Bankers Trust), or as international retail money service
companies (Citibank), or like Merrill Lynch, have come from
investment banking to establish themselves more like
retail/commercial bank investment service companies.
Finally, a few banks chose to remain in the traditional
banking businesses, merging with or taking over other banks,
to grow into mammoth, national commercial banking entities,
the super-regionals."2
SYNDICATING CONSTRUCTION LOANS: THE FLEET CENTER
Construction lending has become a highly lucrative business
for these banks who have remained in the business. Consider
the case of Boston's own Fleet Center, a well known,
privately financed, multi-use stadium facility. Jerry Ward
of Bank Boston explains, "I got a call one day from the
chairman of the bank. He said, Jerry, we're going to
12 Interview with Matt Galligan, Director of Real Estate Banking, Fleet
Bank, Septembet 1997.
finance the new Boston Garden.""3 The owner/developer of
the stadium, Jerry Jacobs, was a long time customer of the
bank, and the deal had the type of PR potential that the
bank loved. It was 1993, and the real estate market was
just beginning to re-awaken. Jerry Ward started the
process.
1. Basic Construction Finance: "You have to know
construction loans and know them well."
2. Assemble your Experts: Call a construction engineer,
title lawyer, investment banker, insurance consultant,
et.al.. Don't second guess the advice of your experts.
3. Assemble your Budget: Rely on your construction
engineer. Here you will argue with the owner about the
budget. Eventually you will come to an agreement. The
owner will always want more money and want the bank to
cover contingency funding.
4. Assemble your Revenues: A stadium is essentially just
a gigantic restaurant. There are three sources of
predictable revenue:
a) Food Revenue: Concessions, in this case run by
Delaware North Company.
b) Schmooze Boxes: Luxury boxes leased long term to
local companies. Also special seats sold in
blocks in perpetuity.
13 Lecture given by Jerry Ward, MD Real Estate Group, Bank Boston, MIT
Center for Real Estate, December 1997.
c) Ticket Sales: More difficult to judge, but some
factor is included.
5. Slice, Dice, Negotiate - GO!: All the parties to the
deal will contend for pieces of the revenue. The bank
will be willing to do the deal as long as the previous
four steps have been successfully completed, and the
results satisfy the following ratios:
a) COI/IDS = 1.2-1.4, COI = Contractually Obligated
Income (from #4, #5), IDS = Imputed Debt Service
(from #3,#5).
b) Loan/Cost < .7
The ratios in #5 are important. In the 1980's there were no
such guidelines. In the 1990's as a result of the FIREA and
FIDICIA laws which were passed in response to the S&L
debacle,real estate loans must meet these criteria. If
not, directors of the bank may be personally liable to fines
by the federal government.
Finally, negotiationsover the Fleet Center were completed.
Each of the three lead banks, Fleet, Bank Boston, and
Shawmut, would loan a third of the $160 million of debt
needed for the project at LIBOR+250 basis points. It is
insignificant that construction was completed early and
below budget, and that the banks were financed out of the
deal three years early. It is insignificant because Bank
Boston sold their loan to a syndicate of 10 other banks six
22
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According to Matt Galligan, Managing Director of Real Estate
Investment Banking at Fleet Bank in Boston, the changes in
the banking industry have led to the development of only
three "super-regional" banks which have taken large
positions in real estate finance. These banks are Fleet
Bank in the Northeast, Nationsbank in the Southeast in
Midwest, and Wells Fargo in the Midwest and West Coast.
While there are still some large more localized banks with
ongoing real estate asset lending concerns, such as Republic
National Bank, and Bank of New York, sponsors of major
construction projects are frequently relying on the three
Super-regionals for debt financing.14
14 Interview with Matt Galligan, Director of Real Estate Banking, Fleet
Bank, September 1997.
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Unfortunately, the Super-regional banks, as a result of
their own size and the scope of their market, may in coming
years be beset by a number of project lending pitfalls:
Construction Lending Difficulties for Super-Regional Banks
* The local commercial bank's advantages in development
finance of knowing the local real estate market and being
acquainted with the local developers are not available to
the super-regionals. Fleet, which is headquartered in
Boston for example, must maintain banking relationships
with developers from Maine to Virginia, and is involved
with construction projects over the same 1500 miles of
territory.
* The lack of competition to provide project credit in each
region means that credit will always be tight. Tight
credit leads to onerous loan terms such as high interest.
The high interest rates may only be acceptable to the
most risk-loving borrowers, invoking moral hazard
problems, loan defaults, and even higher interest rates.
* With no alternative sources of financing, if one super-
regional makes a policy decision to avoid real estate
loans, it could cause a massive credit crunch,
exacerbating loan default problems.
* Loan officers are not independent decision makers. Banks
set policies on interest rates and loan to value
requirements and generally cannot make appropriate
judgements if either of these differ from the standard,
or if the asset/project in question has special
circumstances and special risks to underwrite.
* Commercial banks are unsure of whether construction
lending is a profit center or a customer service. Bank
policies have been unclear recently on this issue.
25
How DID DEVELOPERS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE TRADITIONAL SOURCES OF FINANCING
IN THE 1980's?
"As long as real estate developers can 'finance out' of individual deals
- that is borrow, or raise as equity funds, more money than their
projects cost, and have none of their own capital at risk - they will
continue to construct more space, regardless of whether the market
really needs it. Why? To earn fees, to keep their organizations busy,
and because each developer believes he or she can capture whatever tiny
market segment remains unserved."
- Salomon Brothers, What Have We Learned From the 1980s Experience!
According to Matt Galligan, the type of developer described
above exists primarily in the New York Metropolitan area,
but realistically, this is the method espoused by most
private developers nationwide. The method is, by achieving
a high enough loan to value ratio (or low enough debt
service coverage ratio) in permanent financing, and
vertically integrating enough of the design-construction
value chain, the developer can create the project while
taking virtually no risk. How does it work?
Consider the 1977 Harvard Business School case of "Savannah
West." In Savannah West, a small-time, Georgia general
contractor and real estate developer named Willy Welsh had a
good idea and a vertically integrated real estate company to
realize it. 1
1s Course Readings, Real Estate Finance and Investment, MIT, Professor
Timothy Riddiough, 1997.
16 Information for analysis taken from a Harvard Business School Case
Study, "Savannah West," prepared by John Vogel, 1980.
-maeril
Design Consultants (A/E)
unknown, Possibly Willy Welsh
Tenants
Vacancy rates for garden apartments in the Savannah, GA,
area were less than 4%, and Welsh had acquired an 11 acre
tract of land in a well serviced location to capitalize on
the market demand. Empire State Savings Bank was willing to
give Welsh a 10.25%, partially amortizing, 12 year permanent
mortgage for no more than 75% of the value of the
successfully rented asset. To determine the loan amount,
Empire State had commissioned an appraisal of the property
to be built. The appraisal yielded a few relevant
evaluations.
I Labor -~-
Rental Income
Unit Type Number Potential Rent* (mo) lAnnual Revenue
1BR(a) 24 $ 190 $ 54,720
1BR(b) 24 $ 210 $ 60,480
2BR(a) 36 $ 220 $ 95,040
2BR(b) 36 $ 230 $ 99,360
2BR(c) 36 $ 240 $ 103,680
2BR(d) 36 $ 250 $ 108,000
3BR(a) 12 $ 265 $ 38,160
3BR(b) 12 $ 290 $ 41,760
Total Potential Rental Income $ 601,200
Auxiliary Incomeo (unit/mo) $ 10 $ 25,920
Less Vacancy/Bad Rent 5% $ (31,356)
Gross Income $ 595,764
Expensest $ (172,315)
Reserves $ (27,336)
Funds From Operations $ 396,113
Capitalized Value Cap. Rate 10% $ 3,961,000
* Based on rent levels in sirrilar properties.
o Includes laundry machines, cleaning fees, furniture rentals, et. al.
t Includes mqrrt. fee, taxes, insurance, sanitation, pest control, utilities, et. al.
Category units cost/unit* cost
Apartment Area (st) 197,372 $ 15.00 $ 2,960,580
Hallway Area (st) 9,072 $ 5.00 $ 45,360
Clubhouse (sf) 800 $ 18.00 $ 14,400
Pool 1 $ 12,000.00 $ 12,000
Tennis Courts 2 $ 10,000.00 $ 20,000
Paving and Parking (sy) 14450 $ 4.50 $ 65,025
Landscaping and Site $ 3,052,340.00 5% $ 152,617
Total Hard Costs $ 3,269,982
Construction Loan Interest (avg. bal) $ 1,961,989.20 10% $ 196,199
Misc., Profit, Fees, Overhead (of total) $ 3,466,180.92 15% $ 519,927
Total Soft Costs $ 716,126
Land Value $ 200,000
Grand Total Rounded Value $ 4,186,000
*Based on an analysis of cost data obtained from developer/contractors who are knowledgable about the
cost of building apartments in this area
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Judging from the results of the two evaluations, Empire
State was comfortable assuming the built property to be
worth $4 million. Thus, at 75% loan to value, Empire State
agreed, subject to numerous terms and conditions, to loan
Savannah West $3 million once construction was completed and
occupancy at projected rent was established.
Of course, from Willy Welsh's perspective, the project was
significantly different. The following chart compares
Welsh's cost estimates to those of his permanent lender.
Component Welsh Bank Appraisal Difference
Land Purchase $ 172,000 $ 200,000 16%
Hard Costs $ 2,578,000 $ 3,269,982 27%
Arch, Eng, Inspection $ 50,000 $ 226,055 352%
Construction Interest $ 135,000 $ 196,199 45%
Legal and Accounting $ 20,000 $ 90,422 352%
Loan Fees $ 45,000 $ 203,450 352%
Total $ 3,000,000 $ 4,186,108 40%
Thus, by vertically integrating enough of the important
development operations, Welsh was able to keep his
development costs below the amount of the permanent loan, or
internalize his profits at the front of the deal. Consider
what this meant for Savannah West's potential internal rate
of return. Examine this "back of the envelope" analysis.
Investment Income
Loan Drawn Down $ 3,000,000 $ 3,000,000 $ 3,000,000
Construction Cost $ 3,000,000 $ 3,450,000 $ 3,000,000
Investment Cost $ - $ 450,000 $ 450,000
Rent $ 595,764 $ 595,764 $ 551,082
Expenses $ (199,651) $ (199,651) $ (199,651)
Permanent Loan $ 3,000,000 $ 3,000,000 $ 2,550,000
Interest $ (306,900) $ (306,900) $ (260,865)
Net Annual Revenue (pre-tax) $ 89,213 $ 89,213 $ 90,566
IRR I 20% 20%
Notice how, even given a 15% development cost over-run, or
an 8% decrease in expected rental income, Welsh still
maintains a high IRR. In the optimistic case, Welsh's IRR
is infinite, he has created a "free" option. The problem
for the bank is, since Welsh has not invested any of his own
money in the project, he would have had no reason to attempt
to carry it if the market was not as good as expected. To
be more specific, if Welsh noticed that the market for
garden apartments was such that he would have achieved only
90% of expected revenue, he would have had no financial
reason to complete construction and "take-out" the
construction loan with the permanent. Rather, he would have
simply defaulted and walked away.
All the while, Alison Porter, a loan officer from Chemical
Bank, was deciding whether or not she should recommend that
Welsh be advanced $3 million in the form of a construction
loan. Porter, the case study explains, for the most part
3
had an entirely different set of incentives. "Welsh was
exactly the kind of customer Chemical's 'Real Estate Bank'
was looking for. Chemical was committed to expanding its
direct lending in the South Atlantic region. ... Welsh might
be exactly the right person on whom Chemical should take a
chance. He had the potential to become a major regional
developer. Here was Chemical's chance to become his bank."
These circumstances were similar to those of many much
larger construction loans made up until the end of the
1980s. With so many deals like this, is it any wonder why
there were so many loan defaults in the last decade? This
case also provides, in a sense, the setting for this thesis.
We presume that private debt financiers today have learned
from the 1980s experience, that loan to value ratios are
much lower, that investors are much more cautious about real
estate deals, that the ordinary, conventionally financed,
infinite IRR project is a rarely possible dinosaur. What
then must a real estate developer do to finance construction
projects and still limit his own risk? This thesis will
address some of the remaining, viable possibilities.
IMPROVING THE DEBT ISSUE - CREDIT ENHANCEMENT VIA GOVERMENT ASSISTANCE
If the project sponsor finds that the terms of debt finance
for a housing project are truly too onerous, and that he
cannot reasonably obtain conventional bank financing, the
sponsor may attempt to enhance his project's credit via his
State government or the Federal government. Many states and
municipalities have for a long time offered financial
assistance in the form of grants, abatements and loan
guarantees, especially for projects which are politically
expedient, such as low-income housing and nursing homes.
These various programs are too numerous to mention but for
the most part offer many of the same benefits as those
programs offered by the federal government, or are funded
and regulated by HUD (see appendix). The FHA, or Federal
Housing Authority (a branch of HUD), has a responsibility,
through the sponsorship of projects, to create a healthy
supply of affordable housing. This sponsorship is most
often a loan guarantee, a simple grant, or rent payment
assistance.
HUD also makes mortgage insurance available for nursing
homes, intermediate care facilities, board and care homes,
and assisted living facilities (section 232 of the National
Housing Act); public and proprietary hospitals (section 242
of the NHA); and group practice facilities (title XI of the
NHA)).17
MORTGAGE AND LOAN INSURANCE
Through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD
provides insurance for mortgages and loans placed by private
lenders on manufactured homes, single family and multifamily
properties, and certain health and related facilities. This
Federal role is designed to encourage lenders to make
mortgage credit available in areas and to borrowers who may
not otherwise qualify for conventional loans on affordable
terms, such as first-time homebuyers.
Under FHA's authorities, which are numerous and contain a
host of differing features, the Department's role is
essentially that of an insurance company. Consistent with
statutory requirements, HUD will make insurance available in
connection with lenders, borrowers, and properties that meet
certain minimum requirements. Sponsor's equity requirements
vary by program, but are generally less rigorous than those
required by conventional lenders. Developers pay interest
on the loan at a rate that is negotiated with the lender.
17 Information from the web page of the Federal Housing Administration,
"www.fha. gov".
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A periodic mortgage insurance premium is used for all
multifamily authorities. The periodic MIP is assessed by
applying a fixed percentage (generally up to 1% per year by
statute, less by regulation) to the outstanding balance of
the loan during amortization. If the construction or
permanent loan goes into default, HUD will provide insurance
benefits to the lender consistent with the contract of
insurance.
In the case of multifamily projects, this is normally
accomplished by HUD taking an assignment of the mortgage. In
return for paying insurance benefits to the lender, the
lender turns the mortgage over to HUD, which makes HUD the
owner of the mortgage. HUD can thus foreclose on the
mortgage. HUD offsets its insurance losses through the
foreclosure of insured mortgages and subsequent sale of the
properties. With full insurance, HUD insures the entire
loan indebtedness, pays insurance claims on this 100% basis,
and generally takes an assignment of the mortgage.
The most widely used "full insurance" multifamily
authorities are sections "207" and "221(d) (4)." These
provisions offer essentially similar ways of encouraging the
construction and substantial rehabilitation of multifamily
housing. The 1997 government appropriations for FHA
mortgage insurance sets a $110 billion credit limit on
additional insurance commitments for multifamily housing.
Rental Housing for New Construction and Substantial
Rehabilitation 8
Section 221(d) (3) and Section 221(d) (4)
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which is part of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
provides mortgage insurance to facilitate the development of
rental housing. The 221(d) program is FHA's program for the
new construction or substantial rehabilitation of
multifamily rental properties. Section 221(d) (3) is used by
nonprofit and cooperative sponsors; Section 221(d) (4) is
used by profit-motivated sponsors.
The Section 221(d) program is not a direct loan program. FHA
insures loans originated by private, HUD-approved lenders.
Prospective project sponsors/mortgagors are responsible for
finding a HUD-approved lender to make a loan and submit an
application for commitment to the HUD State/Area Office with
jurisdiction for the property location.
Benefits:
* Long-term (up to 40 years), fixed-rate financing
* Eligible for securitization by the Government National
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae)
* Federal guarantee with Ginnie Mae securitization, results
in AAA rating on financing
* Provides construction and permanent financing
* Nonrecourse loans
Program Eligibility:
* Properties must contain 5 or more rental or cooperative
units
* Projects may be designed for elderly (aged 62 or older)
or handicapped residents
* Eligible mortgagors include profit-motivated, nonprofit,
limited distribution, cooperative
* mortgagors
* Properties must comply with specified HUD and local
standards
Mortgage Limitations: The maximum insurable mortgage amount
is the LOWEST of:
* 90 percent of FHA's estimate of project replacement cost
(may be up to 100 percent for nonprofit sponsors)
18 Ibid.
* The amount that can be amortized by 90 percent of net
income for debt service (95 percent for nonprofit
sponsors under Section 221(d) (3)
* Statutory per dwelling unit limits. These limits vary by
HUD State/Area Office jurisdiction.
NOTE: The typical mortgage limiting factor is net income -
FHA's underwriting analysis must establish that there is
sufficient project income to repay the loan, taking into
account all required expenses, replacement reserve
requirements, and a vacancy and collection loss factor.
Mortgage Term and Interest Rate:
* Term is limited to the lower of 40 years or 3/4 of the
project's remaining economic life
* Interest rates are negotiated between the lender and the
borrower
Other Requirements:
* Applications may be staged (e.g., Site Appraisal and
Market Analysis stage, firm commitment).
* Application and inspection fees apply. The application
fee aggregates to $3.00 per $1,000 of requested mortgage
amount at the firm commitment stage. The inspection fee
is $5.00 per $1,000 of mortgage amount.
* Owner must sign Regulatory Agreement with HUD governing
project operations
* Projects are subject to cost certification
* Prevailing wage requirements under the Davis-Bacon Act
apply
AN FHA LOAN GUARANTEE HOUSING PROJECT: THE TOWERS OF AMERICA1 9
In 1993, Ricardo Stone made an excellent real estate
decision based on the 20 years of development experience
which substituted for any formal training in real estate
economics. Had he been formally training he might have
'9 Adapted from a confidential discussion with Murray Kipnis, Vice
President of Huntoon Page and Associates, an FHA mortgage broker and
servicer. Many names have been changed for the purposes of
presentation, although the facts and figures of the case remain
accurate.
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explained, "Paying attention to the symptoms of the supply
cycle of housing (building permits) rather than those of the
demand cycle (market rents) is an effective way to time the
markets and make money developing real estate. The New York
MSA has millions of units of rental housing yet none have
been built in the area since the beginning of the last
recession (1991). I have an opportunity to develop up to
1500 new rental apartments, but market financing constraints
related to the recession are preventing me from doing so.
I'm going to enhance my project's credit, and hence obtain
financing, with assistance from the FHA." However, as an
experienced and practical man, Stone expressed this decision
as, "I want to build some more apartments. The banks won't
lend. Let's do a "D4' job."
The 1500 new rental apartments to which Stone was alluding
are the "Towers of America," a development consisting of 4
near-luxury high rises within a larger, mixed-use project,
located in the New York Metropolitan area. Stone planned to
build these 4 buildings one at a time, beginning with the
"Riverside" and the "Atlantic," a pair of buildings,
adjoined by a common garage, totaling approximately 750
apartments. The Riverside would be first. Stone considered
the annual rent roll for 346 units as well as the cost of
construction per unit. Assuming a capitalization rate of
10, Stone
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figured the project was worth at least a $3 million profit,
as demonstrated on the chart below.
Apartments 346
Avg. Monthly Rent $ 1,700
Annual Income @ 95% Occupancy $ 6,705,480
Annual Expenses/Unit $ 8,500
Total Expenses $ 2,941,000
NOI $ 3,764,480
Value @ .10 Cap. Rate $ 37,644,800
Cost/Unit $ 100,000
Cost $ 34,600,000
Value Creation $ 3,044,800
9%
The Riverside was originally intended to be a condominium
when it was first designed along with the entire project's
master plan in 1986. When Stone made the decision to try
for FHA credit enhancement, the StoneCO design team,
including his general contractor, Primo Antonio, immediately
went to work on some major changes. As a condo, the
building had high ceilings framed in structural steel with a
granite and glass facade. It included features like a roof
garden and an enclosed health club, valet parking and well
appointed apartments. Stone and Antonio knew that these
features would cause the project to be too expensive. Why
too expensive? Because the FHA sets limits on how much
money it is willing to insure for a project, and Stone
wanted to be within those limits.
To be precise, the FHA is willing to insure the amount of
the lesser of three criteria, 90% of replacement cost, 90%
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of net income for debt service, or the regionally adjusted
statutory limits per unit (established by law). Since 90%
of income for debt service and 90% of replacement cost are
almost always generously high numbers, it is almost always
the case that the statutory limits are the deciding factor.
This is evident on line "4.g." of the FHA form on the
following page.2 0
Determination of Maximum Insurable Mortgage
Critfleria column I column 2 column 3
Mortgage or Loan Amount Requested In Application $
Reserved $
Amount Based on Value or Replacement Cost:
a. Value (Replacement Cost) in Fee Simple 1f~5 _33.x q v. s% , . i o 2,
b. (1) Value of Leased Fee S
(2) Grant/Loan funds attributable to R. C. items $
(3) Excess Unusual Land Improvement $
(4) Cost Containment Mortgage Oeduction
(5) Total lines (1) to (4) S X- % S - JA
c. Unpaid Balance of Special Assessment $ r
d. Total line b plus line c n..- ..- _. _
e. Une a minus line d -L. -.. 8.. $ f
Amount Based on Limitations Per Family Unit:
a. Number of no Bedroom Units ---- - 2 x ' $ i7.9 0.
Number of one Bedroom Units-- \9 X S$ I .. .i -
Number of two Bedroom Units .. j$ " X S S ()i. : . . i .
Number of three Bedrdom Unitl'":' .. ..... X $
Number of four or more Bedroom' Units.: ' :.i X S $ ..-.. .. ; '" .n;: o..
ti. Cost Not Attributable to DwellingUse t : S . 5 s. 3V k i.
a: Site Not Attributable to Dwelling Use Svt X20 %lV' 4 1: m *
d..otalsines a thrqh. e
e. Total Number of Spaces ,.,'.' X i 5 _- __'_ i S P.! "mt'f ri.:
f. Sum: Vale of Leased Fee and Unpaid Balance of Sped Amsnment(q) , J ..Aon ... . $ .
q. ULine d ii ini',whhicir s applicdble minus line I l. . •
oAonn eind' ebt Sii i ifce a o:
c. Ini' c...utl 1!a..,1i. 5; .
d. Sum o At vi Fiat* ii;' ''ir . l
fI., AMniAdl Gr 'rii"d Reit$ + dAnnu d S 17
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20 The forms presented are photocopies of the actual forms used by the
FHA for final approval of this project.
x
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Meanwhile, Stone called Murray Kipnis, his representative
who shepherded his projects through the FHA process. Then
Stone summoned one of his best accountants and one of his
most experienced lawyers, and instructed them to begin
preparing the significant amount of paperwork which the FHA
requires. As Steve Waterman, Stone's accountant explained,
certain wrinkles in the laws regarding statutory limits make
it possible for sly, vertically integrated developers to
acheive an excellent value for the statutory limits. First
examine lines "4.b." and "4.c." of the form on the preceding
page. Then consider the following form."
TO BE COMPLETED BY CONSTRUCTION COST ANALYST:
COST Nor ..v\TT llI1Ui .\IIL*: iO U F:.LIING UtSE-
;n...r ..i .-- -- ' - -........ - - - - -- - - _ / -,
Othor ---~i ----------------- ---- -TOTL "--------- -- - -
S(h '.. TOT L - - - - - - - - - - - - -.......... .'.,' ,,
. Y; .
TOTAL EST. COST OF OFF-SITE 11EQUIRFIEMNTS-
_O_-i . .F. Co. '
TOTAL OFF-SITE COSTS-- S '- , -
' I .)
N. TO BE COMPLETED BY VALUATION SECTION:
C.\LCULATION OF BUDGETED CONSTRUCTION COST-I.
Ill.
20.
21.
22.
21.
21.
25.
26.
27.
2.
29.
30.
.11.
* l vi,,ntm %Inrtgng# A .neint (from
2264n) 90% nr x- - - - - - - - - -0.. - - -..............
(IVichever is Appropriate)
IIA,\ L.ndt Vnle,. (.ine C 72) s SL 97A o_
CnrryinM Chlnrgem nd Fin.- - -- _t._--
I.ei nnld OrRntiirntion - - - I 0 So u
Con-letnt Fee.........-
De!itn Ar'hilect - - - - -. - - I..7le,Ot.
Spviory Arehitt - _ CI, L87
[Innd Premim . .------------- 311
.,rpplmennli N nnnitelnIn Fund
CnnfIingtnry Ie.q.erv.--- - .
Other Fe-'- -- - - - - - - - z-----L/
Tot'al 19 thru 28 - Dediet -
fl, Imnce avn ilnhl for r-onstruction ........
Thin incnlq hbuilder's fee of S
n, Mnlu. Ovhrl. & nSPRA of S,/.* *Jq9f
, , -I,€t ', l 5
As the above table shows, the developer is
as part of the statutory limit 90% of cost
to apartments. That means, in addition to
allowance, the sponsor may add 90% of cost
able
not
the
and
to include
attributable
statutory
cost of land
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$ lZ.IA,3 a$ .
21 Ibid.
I II
- .-- -
for garages, health clubs, parks, etc.. By inflating the
value of the associated land, and generously estimating
construction cost, the developer can greatly improve his
statutory loan insurance allowance.
Kipnis arranged a meeting between some StoneCO executives,
including Stone, and some functionaries of the FHA. The
meeting would be held at the FHA's Newark office because the
project's location indicated that that office would be the
appropriate one to handle the project. StoneCO executives,
along with Kipnis, arrived at the office one morning in
July, 1993. The local FHA economist, a key member of the
government's decision making team, was late. Actually, the
local economist for the Newark office did not exist at the
moment. He had recently retired and, his position left
temporarily unfilled, the office was relying on the
economist from the Buffalo office to consider Stone's
request. StoneCO presented their preliminary set of
required documents, pitched the FHA on the idea, talked a
little about the process and departed.
Several months later, Kipnis called Stone, "We're having
some problems with the Newark office." Apparently, the
Buffalo economist was against the deal. He believed that
350 units (the "Riverside") were simply too many for the
market. More likely, the Buffalo economist was
uncomfortable making any big decisions with respect to the
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New York City market. After all, he was unfamiliar with it,
and probably had little training in the principles of real
estate economics to be capable of making the decision. The
"Riverside" was rejected. Kipnis promptly resubmitted it
with some changes, hoping that StoneCOs persistence would
demonstrate confidence in the development. A year later,
nothing had happened.
At last, Kipnis convinced the Newark officials to allow the
economist from the New York City FHA Office, David Byrne, to
take responsibility for the large-scale multifamily
decisions at Newark, at least those in the vicinity of this
project. Waterman and Kipnis took Byrne to a lavish lunch
at a restaurant with a view of the site. Waterman recalls,
"One plate of fried clams and we had him." Byrne himself
was not necessarily the best qualified to make the
judgement, but at least he recognized the area's significant
housing shortage and, as the market had begun to improve,
increasing rents. Final approval from the FHA on the
project was given in January, 1995, a full 18 months after
its inception.
But what does approval mean? Essentially, it means that the
FHA is willing to guarantee 99% of the acceptable maximum
loan amount, in exchange for possession of the note, to
whoever agrees to provide the mortgage. As an agency of the
federal government, the FHA's credit rating is AA. That
means, bankruptcy related fees notwithstanding, 99% of the
construction loan could be rated AA as well. A number of
regular buyers of this type of insured debt solicit Kipnis
to invest. These investors would not normally invest in
construction loans, but under the circumstances are happy to
do so. In the case of "Riverside," three offers were taken
for the debt. Two, from conventional sources, were willing
to purchase the loans at an 8.5% interest rate. One, from a
special source, the AFL-CIO Housing Investment Trust, bid
8.25%. However, in exchange for this lower rate of
interest, the trust required that all work on the project be
performed by organized, unionized, labor. Since Section
221(d) (4) requires that all workers be paid in accordance
with the Davis-Bacon Act, and further since the project was
located in an area that relies predominantly on unionized
labor anyway, Stone was comfortable placing the loan with
the AFL-CIO's pension fund.
Kipnis recommended that the second building, "Atlantic," be
submitted immediately as a "fast-track" application, while
the background of the first project was still fresh in the
minds of the FHA functionaries. Approval on the second
building was granted only 48 days after submission of
application.
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S Evaluation o the Atlanti
14% 27%
.r. l r _.. .l _
Optimistic Cost Overrun Rent Reducion
Devel opmen
Hard Costs
Soft Costs
Interest
Taxes, Insurance, Fees
Total Development Costs
FHA Insured Amount
JAMIE's Equity Requirement
Oraio
Revenue
Costs
EBIT
Interest
Depreciation
Taxes
Net Income Including Tax Credits
The FHA has offices and sub-offices in all of the major
metropolitan areas around the United States. The quality of
the FHA's service varies from office to office, so chances
of access to FHA programs vary from city to city. Since the
FHA does not have profit as a motivation for providing loan
guarantees, its pattern of decision may seem rather random
to the outside observer. Actually, this is a result of a
few key factors the sponsor must recognize before attempting
to obtain assistance from the FHA.
* Unless the sponsor already has a lot of experience in
dealing with the FHA and has successfully completed many
48,194,000
2,196,324
4,000,000
54,390,324
54,238,100
152,224
55,037,000
2,508,176
4,000,000
61,545,176
54,238,100
7,307,076
48,194,000
2,196,324
4,000,000
54,390,324
54,238,100
152,224
8,400,000
3,250,000
5,150,000
3,932,262
1,661,862
(175,873)
1,393,611
8,400,000
3,250,000
5,150,000
3,932,262
1,897,828
(269,316)
1,487,053
6,144,600
3,250,000
2,894,600
3,932,262
1,661,862
(1,069,012)
31,349
IRR 715% 20% 20%
S.. . ,.
such projects, he will need a specialist to shepherd the
project through the FHA process. This specialist, an FHA
service broker, receives a percentage fee much like an
ordinary mortgage broker would. The broker's
relationship with the functionaries at the local FHA
office will make the deal possible.
* Each FHA office has an "economist," who has the right to
veto any project for any reason. These individuals must
be sweet-talked and sold on the idea of the project.
Moreover, although they are known as "economists" these
officials generally have no particular aptitude for real
estate economics.
* Appropriation for FHA programs are determined annually by
the federal government. In times of economic plenty
(when federal tax coffers are full) these programs are
well funded. Unfortunately, even though periods of
recession may be the times of greatest need for
affordable housing and economic stimulation, the FHA
finance programs will certainly be poorly funded.
* Local FHA officials are perhaps the most backward looking
of all investors. When the real estate market is hot,
there is always plenty of interest in projects.
* The FHA offers a myriad of non-profit and social service
oriented programs, sometimes not even related to housing.
In the case that the project can include some health
service, elderly service, minority or woman owned
business, or other social "good," there are bound to be
46
plenty of additional, special FHA concessions for
development.
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DEBT FROM WALL STREET
"Is Wall Street the S&L's of the 1990s?"22 Tim Riddiough, Professor of
Real Estate, MIT.
When this thesis addressed the capabilities of commercial
banks (above), it concluded that for corporate reasons, loan
officers were generally incapable of making real estate
loans at competitive terms when the asset in question did
not fit exactly into the typical specified criteria of the
bank. For example, a loan officer may quote you a 7.5%
mortgage on a 75% loan:value property, but when you request
a quote on the same property at only 50% loan:value, the
loan officer will likely quote you the same 7.5% interest
rate. In other words, commercial banks are poorly equipped
to handle loans with special circumstances, either bad or
good. To some extent, underwriting departments of some of
the various Wall Street firms have stepped in to fill the
need for special debt financing.
One company which has found the skills of Wall Street
underwriters useful is KEERA, Koll ENSR Environmental Realty
Advisors.23 KEERA is a joint venture between CB Commercial
and ENSR Corporation that opportunistically acquires
environmentally impaired real estate throughout the United
22 Lecture given by Professor Timothy Riddiough, Real Estate Finance and
Investment, MIT, November 1997.
23 Lecture given by Doug Johnson, "Financing Environmental Remediation
Redevelopment," Cambridge, MA, November 1997.
States. By combining the extensive resources and core
competencies of both companies, KEERA can successfully
acquire, manage, reposition and remediate properties across
the country. KEERA enhances value by improving cash flows
and eliminating risks (both environmental and real estate)
for future purchasers.
Consider the case of 200 South Tryon Street, a construction
project in downtown Charlotte, NC. Charlotte, as it has
happened, has had the fastest growing demand for office
space and naturally the most rent price growth, of any city
in the United States over the last 5 years. 200 South Tryon
Street is a 270,000 square foot building which stands at the
corner of South Tryon and 4th, on Charlotte's most important
downtown street, in the middle of Charlotte's central
business district, one block from Trade Street, Charlotte's
absolute, ground zero, premier office location. Despite all
of this market strength, 200 South Tryon Street is
completely vacant. Why?
Ignore the fact that the building was built in 1962, and
that it requires upgrades in its HVAC, conveyance, fire
safety, plumbing, electrical and exterior facing systems.
Ignore the miscellaneous but expensive architectural
upgrades the building requires, such as new bathrooms and
ceiling tiles. The really big problem with 200 Tryon Street
is asbestos. The building's entire steel structure has
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spray-on asbestos fire protection. It also has asbestos
floor tiles and insulation. Before 200 Tryon Street can be
brought to market, whoever redevelops this building must
fully abate the asbestos situation as well as upgrade the
various systems.
Acquisition Cost $ 4,400,000.00
Asbestos Abatement $ 2,470,000
HVAC Upgrade $ 1,428,000
Elevator Upgrade $ 120,000
Fire Safety Improvement $ 425,000
Plumbing Improvment $ 100,000
Electrical Upgrade $ 700,000
Architectural Upgrades $ 1,065,669
Fees and Contingency $ 200,000
Tenant Improvements $ 2,477,500
Lease Commissions $ 981,701
Total Construction Costs $ 14,367,870
Currently, the building is considered class "B" office
space. After the 12 month long upgrade period, KEERA, a
company which specializes in this type of development,
believes the building will be class "A." 200 Tryon has a
total rentable area of 201,450 feet. Because of the very
strong Charlotte market, KEERA believes the building will be
fully leased very quickly, with the first leases coming in 7
months, and gradually filling the building up through the
18th month. Based on historical operating expenses, KEERA
believes this building will cost about $6.50/square foot to
operate. KEERA figured it could achieve rents at least 25%
below market levels, between $12 - $18 per square foot. But
who would finance such a project? KEERA did not have $14
million to invest in the deal. Commercial banks simply did
not make construction loans on projects with environmental
problems. Moreover, this project had an existing, albeit
non-income producing, semi-viable asset to back the loan.
So KEERA shopped the deal to a number of Wall Street
investment banks. At last KEERA obtained financing from
Lehman Brothers. Lehman agreed to finance the deal almost
completely with debt, requiring KEERA to put up only
$150,000 of equity for construction, a 99% loan:cost ratio.
In return, Lehman would require a construction period (18
month) rate of interest of LIBOR + 500, approximately 10%.
Since operationally the project would have a Debt:EBIT ratio
of about 10%, this meant that Lehman would be entitled to
basically all of the project's income in case of problems,
as well Lehman should be since it provided 99% of the
financing. After construction was completed, Lehman would
convert about 31% of the debt to junior mezzanine notes,
with a preferred 10% rate of interest, while holding the
remaining debt as senior secured debt at 7%. Since Lehman
would underwrite only $14,413,273 of permanent debt, and the
project would require $15,514,340 of construction and
construction interest costs, KEERA would have to pay an
additional $951,607 in carrying costs to get the project
afloat. In the end, the project would have a loan:value
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ratio of about 70%, with a blended interest rate of about
7.93%.
I Pr c A
Re-Construction & Acquisition Cost
KEERA's Equity Requirement
Construction Loan Interest @10%
Senior Permanent Debt
Mezzanine Permanent Debt
Total Permanent Financing
KEERA's Total Equity Requirement
Rental Income
Operations Cost
EBIT
Senior Debt Interest @ 7%
Mezzanine Debt Interest @ 10%
Pre-tax Income
Depreciation
Taxes
Income including Tax Credits
SimDlified IRR
Per Square Foot
$ 53.33
$ 0.56
$ 4.25
$ 57.58
$ 36.60
$ 16.90
$ 53.50
$ 4.08
$ 11.51
$ 6.50
$ 5.01
$ 2.56
$ 1.69
$ 0.75
$ 1.06
$ (0.12)
$ 1.18
26%
Is the KEERA deal a good one for KEERA, for Lehman Brothers?
Is the mezzanine debt a good investment? It seems that Wall
Street firms are better at answering these questions than
commercial banks. In this deal, Lehman did specialty
construction financing at specialty interest rates, proving,
to an extent, Miller & Modigliani's ideas about the costs of
capital in frictionless markets. Is Wall Street a good
source of debt financing in general?
In some ways it is. Consider the following:
1. Wall Street is much better at pricing risk in non-
standard deals than ordinary banks.
2.As a result, Wall Street can effectively offer a number
of real estate finance instruments at appropriate prices,
such as mezzanine debt.
3. Wall Street provides one stop shopping - a developer can
obtain senior and junior debt, as well as opportunity
fund equity, REIT equity and investment agent services
from a Wall Street firm.
4. Where commercial banks relationship with local developers
is a strength, Wall Street firms relationship with New
York area developers is similarly important.
In other ways, however, it is not:
1. Wall Street firms rarely have in house construction
expertise and may have problems monitoring the debt
advancement process.
2. Wall Street firms offer their services nationally, and
thus may be administering construction loans 'at arms
length.'
3. Wall Street firms may not really understand what they are
getting in to with these types of loans.
capital in frictionless markets. Is Wall Street a good
source of debt financing in general?
In some ways it is. Consider the following:
1. Wall Street is much better at pricing risk in non-
standard deals than ordinary banks.
2. As a result, Wall Street can effectively offer a number
of real estate finance instruments at appropriate prices,
such as mezzanine debt.
3. Wall Street provides one stop shopping - a developer can
obtain senior and junior debt, as well as opportunity
fund equity, REIT equity and investment agent services
from a Wall Street firm.
4. Where commercial banks relationship with local developers
is a strength, Wall Street firms relationship with New
York area developers is similarly important.
In other ways, however, it is not:
1. Wall Street firms rarely have in house construction
expertise and may have problems monitoring the debt
advancement process.
2. Wall Street firms offer their services nationally, and
thus may be administering construction loans 'at arms
length.'
3. Wall Street firms may not really understand what they are
getting in to with these types of loans.
4. Wall Street firms may be making these loans for the wrong
reasons. For example, Ethan Penner, of Nomura, has been
noted for making these loans as loss leaders, to generate
more permanent commercial real estate loan business. Why
would Penner promote such a risky strategy?
CMBS, Loss LEADERS AND THE FACIT
CMBS is an anagram for commercial mortgage backed security.
A CMBS is a security which is collateralized by a number of
parsed commercial real estate assets. It is a mortgage
which is backed by pieces of lots of other mortgages. The
CMBS came about in 1986 when federal tax laws began to
permit the REMIC. Since then, CMBS has grown into a 110
billion dollar industry; 25% of all commercial mortgages
wind up in pieces in various CMBSs. A CMBS, which is
collateralized by a variety of assets, has less risk of
volatile devaluation than a security which is backed by an
individual asset.
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Wall Street firms have taken full advantage of the tax law
changes which permit the CMBS. By originating loans or
buying whole loans from conduits, they can bundle, strip,
and package these loans as CMBS, and sell them to investors
at a premium. If they can sell mortgages at 100 basis
points less than they buy them, Wall Street firms stand to
make 11 billion dollars from CMBS in the near future. As a
result, some firms' desires to acquire these mortgages is
very strong. Some recent notable examples are Nomura and
C.S.First Boston. In many cases, the Wall Street firm will
simply buy these loans from a loan originating conduit,
commercial bank, or other traditional permanent loan source.
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Loathesen Orfirms have beguina to provideing CMBS
exchange for guaranteed rights 
to the permanenCondut mortgages
the lucrative permanent mortgages, 
the firms are engaging in
a form of lending 
in which they 
have no sophistication 
or
Mo1rtga andLoanServicing 
$ @a- I 75
$ Spread = 
2 bp 
$ 
$ L R+ 
b
As of this strong d sire for mortgages, m ny of
these firs have begun to provide construction loans in
exchange for guaranteed rights to the permanent mortgages.
The greatest danger of this is that in their attempt to gain
the lucrative permanent mortgages, the firms are engaging in
a form of lending in which they have no sophistication or
expertise. That, coupled with the notion that some of these
firms are making these construction loans as "loss leaders,"
makes this prospect a very fearsome one. In any event,
changes in the 1997 tax law have potentiated a new real
estate asset backed security called the FACIT. The FACIT
allows for stripped, fully accruing wholly substitutable
assets as the collateral for mortgage backed securities.
Analysts believe that this will soon develop into CMBS
construction loans, securities which are backed by pieces of
a variety of construction projects. To date, no such asset
has been created but analysts expect to see the first of
these in the near future.24
24 Discussion of FACIT loans from lecture given by Lee Sandwen, Members
Meeting of the MIT Center for Real Estate, December 1997.
WHAT ABOUT THE REITs?
"There is nothing wrong with the development business as long as the
risk is priced accordingly. "25 Sam Zell, Chairman, Equity Office, Equity
Residential REITs.
Much has been said about the REITs, Real Estate Investment
Trusts, in the last 10 years. The credit crunch of the
early 1990s coupled with the permissive changes in the 1986
federal tax law made REITs a viable solution for the various
owner/builders who experienced financial distress as a
result of that period's real estate recession. Currently
there are hundreds of REITs, many of which have corporate
backgrounds in development and construction and still others
which tout themselves as developers as a means of
insinuating growth potential. In theory, with easy access
to public equity capital as well as the ability to issue
corporate public debt at low rates, a REIT has an extremely
low cost of capital for development purposes. A REIT does
not have to go through the arduous task of convincing
lenders and equity partners to loan or invest money in a
project, one at a time. Rather, a REIT can simply call an
investment bank, ask for money, and get it (cheap).26
2s Lecture given by Sam Zell, Members Meeting of the MIT Center for Real
Estate, December 1997.
26 Interview with Chip Nisbet, Vice President, Morgan Stanley Real
Estate Opportunity Fund, November 1997.
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Many real estate developers may believe that a REIT's cost
of capital is the dividend yield of its stock. In that
regard, dividend yields range from 9.1% (Alexander Haagen
Properties) to 3.1% (Koger Equity). For companies with some
growth potential, dividend yields of 5% are not uncommon.
But verily, this is not the REIT's cost of capital. Rather,
a REIT must contend with the basic principles of corporate
finance. Strong REIT's are generally funded about 20% debt
and 80% equity. Debt costs are very low, perhaps as low as
6.75%.27
27 Interview with Phil Tager, Senior Vice President, Donaldson, Lufkin
and Jenrette, Real Estate Investment Banking, November 1997.
Components of REIT
Cost of Equity
Private Finance Structure
Equity, however, must provide the same, competitive return
on investment of any common equity. A stock buyer
considering investing in a REIT stock expects that the stock
will return about 13% on investment, a fair reward for the
risk involved with ownership. In the case of a typical,
strong REIT, this 13% amounts to 5% dividends, 2%
appreciation of assets, and 6% growth in value. Thus a
stock trading at $20 paying a $1 per share annual dividend
should be trading at 21.9/16 and paying a $1.08 dividend by
the end of the year. In actuality then, a REIT's blended
cost of capital is 11.75%. Furthermore, because of the REIT
shareholders' intense expectation of growth, construction
and development capability is a major boon to the company's
implied value. Compared to a private company, which can
finance with 70% debt at 7.75%, and 30% equity at 20%, a
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blended 11.425%, the REIT is not necessarily better
capitalized to own and finance assets.28
Still, many REITs are considered by investors to be worth
well more than the value of their assets. Real estate
assets are often appraised with a capitalization rate, a
multiple of earnings.
1
x Annual EBIT = Asset Value
Cap.Rate
Typical cap rates for privately held real estate assets
range from .8 to .12 (roughly 8 to 12 times cash flow)
depending on asset type and market strength. REITs trade
off a similar factoring, based on FFO (funds from
operations).
(FFOx multiple)- Debt = Equity Value
In the case of very strong REITs, this multiple could be as
high as 30 (effectively a .33 cap rate). In this way, an
asset held by a REIT can be valued three times one held
privately. This means that a REITs acquisition cost of
capital could be 1/3 its actual, as low as 4%. Hence, Wall
Street, and the public investor, may be unrealistically
inflating the value of real estate assets and REITs. For
those REITs which develop, this low acquisition cost of
capital allows them to significantly overpay for
construction and still be lauded by the Wall Street analyst
28 Interview with Steven Cantor, Managing Director, Donaldson, Lufkin
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community. We shall see, over the coming years, how this
over-valuation scenario plays out.
Unfortunately, the structure of a REIT makes it very
difficult for a REIT to successfully develop real estate.
REITs must pay out 95% of their funds from operations to
their shareholders in the form of a dividend. Thus, they
cannot retain earnings for future growth. Development in
real estate is not entirely different from R&D for a high
technology firm. Earnings must be retained and put into the
project, at risk, in the aspiration to long term future
growth. In addition to this problem, REIT expertise is
generally found in acquisition and management of real
property. The risks associated with construction are not
easily overlooked, and not appropriate for the REIT rate of
return. Sam Zell, Chairman of several, very successful
REITs, explains, "As far as I'm concerned there's nothing
wrong with the development business as long as the risk is
priced accordingly. Stable REITs return 8%. Development
risk should not be priced at 9 or 9.5%. There is much more
risk than that.""29 For that reason Zell, like most REIT
CEOs has chosen not to develop real estate but rather play
to his strengths in ownership, management, and operating
efficiency, while acquiring new assets from real estate
companies who act as development agents for a fee, such as
and Jenrette, Real Estate Investment Banking, November 1997.
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Hines Corporation. Hines, it is worth noting, is funded
primarily by private equity opportunity funds.
REITs are excellent buyers, owners, managers and financiers
of real estate assets, but they are not developers. Owner
builders who believe that they can tap a new, cheap source
of construction financing by converting from private to REIT
form will likely discover that they are slaves to their own
public organizations, fighting constantly to acquire more
real estate or else be taken over by another REIT, with
little effective ability to develop property. For those who
are obstinate and still desire direct access to public
equity capital, reforming as a C-Corporation (REOC), real
estate operating company, rather than a REIT may be a
reasonable alternative.
One such company, a firm which owns and develops real estate
in C-Corp form, is Catellus Corp., a San Francisco based
organization. "Catellus Development is a diversified real
estate company with property interests principally in
California and in 10 other states in the West, Southwest and
Midwest." As a C-Corp, Catellus pays no dividend to
shareholders. Meanwhile, from January 1996 to March 1997,
Catellus' equity rose from $6 to $16 per share, or a 178%
annualized return on investment. Furthermore, Catellus is
29 Lecture given by Sam Zell, Members Meeting of the MIT Center for Real
Estate, December 1997.
Capitalized with approximately 50% debt and 50% equity. As
a result, its cost of capital is superb. Assuming its
equity costs 14%, and its debt 7.25%, Catellus cash costs
only 10.63%. Unfortunately, unlike a REIT, Catellus must
pay federal taxes at the corporate level but for the income
tax averse investor, this may be beneficial. The very few
publicly held development C-Corp. companies like Catellus
suffer only from misunderstanding on the part of analysts.
Since most stocks are judged and compared on ratios such as
Price:Earnings, real estate companies like Catellus which
shelter their earnings with depreciation for tax reasons,
generally show no earnings and thus have no competitive P:E
ratio. This has resulted in significant value discounting
by investors. In the case of REITs, analysts are far more
sophisticated and evaluate those companies on their FFO
(funds from operations) rather than simply on earnings. 30
Meanwhile, Catellus has been busy developing $1 billion in
assets such as multifamily residential, flex-industrial and
mixed use developments. By self financing and capitalizing
all of its construction and development costs, Catellus is
able to maintain a significant strategic advantage over the
30 BT Alex Brown Research, Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts, Real
Estate Securities Monthly, December 1997.
REITs. Such a vehicle can viably solve the developer's
public equity problem.31
31 Interview with Ira Yellin, Senior Vice President, Catellus
Development, October 1997.
TAKING IN AN EQUITY PARTNER
One thing we know empirically from contemporary corporate
finance, is that most businesses optimize their static WACCs
somewhere between a 40/60 and 60/40 debt:equity ratio. Real
estate assets, up until recently, have generally been
financed with ratios closer to 80:20, or in many cases, even
higher. As real estate finance continues to approach
corporate finance, we can expect the capital market for real
estate equity to continue to grow to meet that need. How
does private equity work its way into construction
financing? Consider the case of Newport Office Center III,
a project which one New Jersey developer has been trying to
build since 1993.
Joe Immobiliare is an experienced developer in the New York
Area. His specialty has been large scale multi-family
projects but he has successfully created some office
buildings and retail developments (malls) as well. His
current project, Newport, a mixed-use community, calls for
an office corridor consisting of 6-7 high and mid-rise
modern office towers. As of 1997, two of the office towers
have been built; the first with success, was net-leased to a
Japanese Company; the second, built by Immobiliare's
partner, was a failure at first and lost a lot of money, but
recently sold for $155 per square foot, which happens to be
equal to the current overall construction cost of such a
building. Immobiliare has been working on the project since
1983, and has seen two real estate recessions come and go,
leaving their effects on his property values. At the
moment, office space is renting for $31 per square foot per
year, and the two other office buildings in the project are
100% occupied. Immobiliare has asked his construction
department for a rough estimate of what the project will
cost, and his chief general contractor has quoted the job at
$85 per square foot in hard costs, not including tenant
improvements. Immobiliare hopes he can obtain project
finance like he did on his previous office projects, with
loan-to-values of about 80% including the land which he
believes the bank will value at $20 million even though it
only costs him $12 million. Immobiliare is anxious to get
this project underway while the market is heating up. 32
32 This case study is presented from confidential discussions with
various individuals. Although most names have been changed, the facts
and figures of the case remain accurate.
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Built Area 750000
Usable Area 637500
Construction Period 18
Land $ 12,000,000 $ 16.00
Hard Construction 85 $ 63,750,000 $ 85.00
Interest 8% $ 3,900,509 $ 5.20
Fees and Commissions inc. brokerage $ 20,000,000 $ 26.67
Tenant Improvements 25 $ 15,937,500 $ 21.25
T.I. Interest 8% $ 159,375 $ 0.21
Total Development Costs $ 115,747,384 $ 154.33
Loan Amount 80% $ 98,997,908 $ 132.00
Operating Costs inc. r.e. taxes $ 6,000,000 $ 8.00
Rent (market) 31 $ 19,762,500 $ 26.35
EBIT $ 13,762,500 $ 18.35
Interest Costs (7.25%) $ 7,177,348 $ 9.57
Cash Earnings $ 6,585,152 $ 8.78
Depreciation $ 2,967,882 $ 3.96
Taxes $ 1,432,439 $ 1.91
Net Earnings $ 5,152,713 $ 6.87
Developers Equity Requirement $ 16,749,477 $ 22.33
Simplified IRR 27% 27%
The deal looked great to Immobiliare. He had the land, the
permits, the stamped plans, and the where-with-all to go
forward-now to decide on a banker. Immobiliare approached
several of his favorite lenders, but to his dismay he found
that none were willing to back this type of project. "We
don't make those kinds of loans anymore," they all replied
in euphemistic terms. "If you want a loan to value ratio of
68
75%, you'd better have the office building at least 35% pre-
leased with credit-worthy tenants. If not, we're not
comfortable making a loan for more than 60% of the expected
value of the project."33 Undaunted, Immobiliare attempted
to comply with the former of the banks' two options, pre-
lease the space. Unfortunately, this type of pre-leasing
has some problems. Let's deal with the economic problem
first.
PRE-LEASING ECONOMIC PROBLEM
If we assume that he can prelease 35% of the office space to
a "bondable" tenant (AAA rated), the bank will be willing to
improve the loan's underwriting based on the value of the
AAA lease. Let's use the Newport Office Center III example.
At a gross rent of $31/sf, net rents, as shown, are close to
$16/sf. Assume Immobiliare can find a tenant willing to pay
this much, and that as a result, the bank is willing to
provide a 20 year, fully amortizing permanent loan. The
bank intends to underwrite 35% of the buildings value at
6.75% interest (50 points above the AAA rate to account for
the subordinated nature of leased space) assuming a 1.05
debt-service coverage ratio. Meanwhile the bank intends to
underwrite the remaining 65% of the building's value at 8%
interest and a 1.35 DSCR.
33 Interview with Matt Galligan, Director of Real Estate Banking, Fleet
Bank, Septembet 1997.
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PV of Loan on AAA Lease
PV of Loan on Speculative Leases
Maximum Loan Amount
Max. Loan @ 100% Speculative
Value Added by AAA Lease
Attributed to 35% of Space
Amortized over 20 Year Lease
Resulting Net Price of AAA Lease
Gross Price
New Loan Amount
Loan-to-Value
Per Square Foot
$ 57.62
$ 75.64
$ 133.25
$ 99.00
$ 34.25
$ 97.86
$9.06
$6.94
$21.94
$ 100.63
63%
As the above chart shows, the AAA tenant accounts for an
additional $34.25 per square foot of building value. Since
most AAA tenants are shrewd negotiators, the tenant in
question will recognize this added value. Realizing that
his lease has a value of $97.86 per square foot, and
amortizing this value over the length of the lease, the AAA
tenant notices that he is entitled to a $9.06 reduction in
rent, or a gross rent of $21/sf instead of $31/sf. With 35%
of the building leased at only $21/sf, using the same bank
underwriting techniques, the building can once again achieve
only a 60% loan-to-value ratio.
Apart from this economic issue, Immobiliare discovered that
because of the peculiarities of the New York M.S.A. market,
it was very difficult to pre-lease the space. Many
potential tenants approached Immobiliare seeking space in a
new building, but most of them were only doing so to extract
greater benefits from the City of New York as incentives not
to cross the river to New Jersey. Also, many of the
potential tenants' representatives, corporate real estate
divisional managers, were more comfortable protecting their
jobs by just signing new leases in existing buildings, even
at much higher rents, than risking an agreement for space
that was not yet in existence. Immobiliare was caught in a
"catch-22." He couldn't build a building without a tenant,
but he couldn't get a tenant without a building.
Immobiliare knew that based on the local area's 100%
occupancy level, the building would perform wonderfully if
only he could get it built. So he weighed the possibility
of building the project on a speculative basis with only a
60% loan.
Construc- t -o -n .Phase C. 0 t - Per S F
Land $ 12,000,000 $ 16.00
Hard Construction 85 $ 63,750,000 $ 85.00
Interest 8% $ 3,900,509 $ 5.20
Fees and Commissions inc. brokerage $ 20,000,000 $ 26.67
Tenant Improvements 25 $ 15,937,500 $ 21.25
T.I. Interest 8% $ 159,375 $ 0.21
Total Development Costs $ 115,747,384 $ 154.33
Loan Amount 60% $ 74,248,431 $ 99.00
Operating Costs inc. r.e. taxes $ 6,000,000 $ 8.00
Rent (market) 31 $ 19,762,500 $ 26.35
EBIT $ 13,762,500 $ 18.35
Interest Costs (7.25%) $ 5,383,011 $ 7.18
Cash Earnings $ 8,379,489 $ 11.17
Depreciation $ 2,967,882 $ 3.96
Taxes $ 2,142,996 $ 2.86
Net Earnings $ 6,236,492 $ 8.32
Developers Equity Requirement $ 41,498,954 $ 55.33
Simplified IRR 12% 12%
Under the above circumstances, the project only manages to
yield a 12% internal rate of return given a $41 million out
of pocket expense. This IRR well below the hurdle rate
required by the developer and this amount of cash investment
is more than he feels comfortable with. After all, he has
assumed the risks of approvals, design, construction, under-
writing, lease-up, general liability as well as long term
management. Immobiliare wonders, is there any way to
improve the projects IRR and also shift some of these risks
Ir
to other parties? Immobiliare is ready for an equity
partnership.
The Construction
The above diagram displays the major requirements of a real
estate construction project. Once the developer has
concluded that a joint venture may be an efficient method of
realizing the project, he must decide who should be
responsible for each of these tasks. In Immobiliare's case,
this would be his first joint venture ever. Without much
experience in joint venturing, Immobiliare began by
approaching a firm which had in the past been a source of
debt financing for his real estate assets, a large insurance
company.
Immobiliare arranged a lunch meeting at the site of the
development with two representatives of the insurance
company. One, a real estate lending officer, came to examine
an apartment building which needed permanent debt financing,
the other, Joe Bonner, the regional director of real estate
equity investments, came to find out more about the office
project. During the course of the days pleasantries the
loan officer made a confession. "We're really not making
too many equity investments in real estate right now. We
got into a lot of trouble over the last recession and we're
pretty much at our limit." The insurance company would be
happy to discuss the loan on the apartment building, but
doubted there would be any possibility of equity finance.
Immobiliare was still hopeful, but after hearing nothing
from Joe Bonner after some weeks abandoned the idea. 3"
Meanwhile, one of Immobiliare's junior executives was busy
exploring other sources of equity partnership when he came
upon the Blackstone Group. Blackstone is a small New York
investment bank which specializes in opportunistic real
estate investing. With about $1 billion of opportunistic
capital to invest in real estate every year, Blackstone was
anxious to put money out. The junior executive discussed
the project with an associate at Blackstone. At first there
was some enthusiasm for the project, but eventually,
Blackstone concluded that the product did not have enough
"grandeur" to be consistent with most of its investments. 35
Finally, Immobiliare was approached by one of his regular
weekend golf partners, Hector Tiburon. Tiburon was the
chairman of Windmill, a very large and successful real
estate investment trust, a publicly held real estate
34 Interview with Joe Bonner, Director of Real Estate Investments,
Prudential Insurance Company, July 1997.
15 Interview with Chad Pike, Associate, The Blackstone Group, October,
1997.
ownership, acquisition and arms-length development company.
Tiburon needed to continue to buy and develop real estate to
keep his company's stock price nice and high.
Unfortunately, acquisition opportunities, like the market
for real estate, were becoming expensive, and the REIT
structure was not conducive to development. Tiburon had
already done several joint ventures and was looking for just
this sort of project. How would the deal work?36
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Essentially, Immobiliare would build the project, Windmill
would finance it, and the two would share some of the
36 Interview with the individual known here as Hector Tiburon, October
unfinished, general real estate responsibilities such as
long term management and lease-up. Immobiliare would
contribute the land as equity, while Windmill would
contribute its underwriting expertise and easy access to
capital. Because of Windmill's reputation on and
relationship with Wall Street, Tiburon was confident that he
could improve the project's underwriting to 70% loan:value.
Meanwhile, Immobiliare would claim that construction costs
were $90 per square foot rather than $85 to imbed a
construction management fee, and would take an additional 5%
as a development fee. Immobiliare's organization was a
fully vertically integrated company, so he would profit from
all of these fees. Also, Immobiliare would claim the land
value was $20 million rather than $12 million, as his
contribution. These numbers would all satisfactorily meet
with Windmill's investment return requirements, as the
following calculations show.
1997.
Land $ 20,000,000 $ 26.67
Hard Construction 90 $ 67,500,000 $ 90.00
Interest 8% $ 4,129,951 $ 5.51
Fees and Commissions inc. brokerage $ 25,386,341 $ 33.85
Tenant Improvements 25 $ 15,937,500 $ 21.25
T.I. Interest 8% $ 159,375 $ 0.21
Total Development Costs $ 133,113,167 $ 177.48
Loan Amount 70% $ 98,779,217 $ 131.71
Operating Costs inc. r.e. taxes $ 6,000,000 $ 8.00
Rent (market) 31 $ 19,762,500 $ 26.35
EBIT $ 13,762,500 $ 18.35
Interest Costs (7.25%) $ 7,161,493 $ 9.55
Cash Earnings $ 6,601,007 $ 8.80
Depreciation $ 3,413,158 $ 4.55
Taxes $ 1,262,388 $ 1.68
Net Earnings $ 5,338,619 $ 7.12
Developers Equity Requirement $ 34,333,950 $ 45.78
Simplified IRR 15% 15%
For Windmill, an IRR of 15% is just fine. It is above its
pure cost of capital (as shown above for REITs in the 11%
range), and thus would effectively be worth three times that
to the shareholders, since Windmill's FFO multiple is over
30. Windmill would buy 50% of the joint venture for 50% of
the "outside" equity requirement, $17,166,975. For
Immobiliare, this was becoming a sweet deal.
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Outside 50% equity requirement $ 17,166,975
Inside Savings
Developmet Fee $ 5,386,341
LandProft $ 8,000,000
Actual Equity Contribution $ 3,780,634
50% Share of Earnings $ 2,669,309
Simplified IRR 58%
By internalizing his development fee and profiting
immediately from the land, Immobiliare is able to improve
his investment return to a whopping 58% while only making a
cash equity contribution of about $4 million, a very
comfortable amount. Better still, Immobiliare can shift
some of the risky development responsibilities like lease-up
and management to his partner. Joint venturing can be an
excellent source of equity capital.
Sources of Equity Capital for Joint Ventures
1. Real Estate Opportunity Funds: Almost everywhere one
looks these days, another "real estate equity opportunity
fund" is popping up. These are also often called
principal investment groups. Most investment banks
perform this kind of investing, such as the "Morgan
Stanley Real Estate Opportunity Fund" or "DLJ Equity
Capital Partners." Smaller investment banking groups
such as Blackstone and Apollo are also heavily involved
in this business. These funds, in times of growth,
generally have between $500 million and $2 billion to
spend on real estate every year, and actively pursue
deals when approached. In most cases their knowledge of
real estate assets is limited, but their familiarity with
discounted cash flow and pro forma evaluation and their
high level of sophistication with underwriting (often
with in house debt capability) is definitely a benefit to
the developer. The stated rate on this type of private
equity investment is between a 20-25% IRR on most deals.
However, due to the enormous, growing, amount of money
invested in these funds, this IRR requirement has slipped
to between 15-20%.37
2. Insurance Companies & Pension Funds: In the 1980s many
insurance companies and pension funds purchased equity
interests in real estate. Asset allocations of insurance
companies are generally determined by higher corporate
policy along with certain federal regulations. This
allocation, common to most companies, is a sum total 10%
in real estate (debt & equity). Insurance companies and
pension funds own equity real estate because it
represents a long term asset which matches well with
their long term liabilities, the lives and careers of
their policy holders. Unfortunately, these entities are
often unsophisticated real estate investors. They are
perhaps the most "backward looking" of all the equity
investors and thus they often accumulate real estate at
37 Interviews with various fund managers including those from DLJ,
Morgan Stanley, Blackstone Group, etc..
high prices when the market is very strong, and as the
market weakens they must sell at severe devaluations to
remain within corporate and regulatory investment
allocation guidelines. According to Joe Bonner, most
analyses account for "market history," "market highs and
lows," "the relationship between replacement cost and
value." Insurance companies have very little
understanding of the construction business, capable of
little more than rough overall cost estimates. Moreover,
insurance companies definitely prefer "show-case" assets,
those located in central business districts with name
recognition and face value. Strangely, even though such
companies often have construction surety businesses and
offer general liability insurance, they do not add these
services to the joint venture value chain. Meanwhile,
these companies have a steady stream of investment
capital, and are not so effected by market volatility.
Insurance companies will buy into assets which produce
between a 10-16% net operating income (FFO), preferring
this hurdle to the more common, leverage inclusive,
return on equity.38
3. REITs: Real estate investment trusts are very good
extremely good equity partners for real estate
development. They are perhaps the most sophisticated of
all possible partners, and are extremely comfortable with
38 Interview with Joe Bonner, Director of Real Estate Investments,
Prudential Insurance Company, July 1997.
the risks inherent to real estate investments because
this is their business. Since most REITs perform
operations such as asset management, sales or leasing,
frequent sophisticated underwriting via agent investment
banks, they can often add value to the development
process. REITs are eager buyers of real estate and
especially need to invest in new development to keep
their shareholders happy (see section on REITs). The
REIT cost of capital, and thus hurdle rate, was shown to
be a pure 11.75%, but for market reasons could be as low
as 4%. However, this market over-valuation may prove
treacherous for some of these firms, and their unwitting
partners, in the future.
4. International Investors: International investors
represent a rather small but significant part of equity
investment in real estate in the United States. In the
1980s, Japanese and Middle Eastern equity found its way
into a number of real estate assets, but most of that was
purchased during market highs which caused long run
losses for the investors. In the 1990s, Middle Eastern
investors still persist in the market (notably Kuwait),
but the Japanese capital has, to a great extent, been
replaced by European, including Dutch, German, English
et. al.. International investors are good sources of
capital because they are not always beholden to the
market volatility in this country. In times when cash
may be tight in America, many foreign investors will have
plenty to invest. International investors are both
opportunistic and asset-allocation driven. In the latter
case, they buy equity real estate as a way of
diversification from uniquely European portfolios. In
the case of Middle Eastern investors, foreign real estate
in stable countries is an excellent diversification from
full dependence on oil and gas resources.
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CONCLUSIONS & REMARKS
The premise of this thesis is that the nature of real estate
finance, and thus construction finance, has changed
drastically since the high flying days of the 1980s. As the
timeline on the previous page shows, the typical 90%+ debt
financed projects of yore, those backed by commercial banks
and S&Ls on the debt side, are gone forever. The
opportunities of the credit crunch of 1990-1992 were
snatched up by Wall Street financiers, providing assets with
CMBS debt and public equity for REITs. The underwriting
standards in this decade have changed, with commercial banks
still providing debt, but only 70% of asset value. Equity,
now a much more important type of financing, can be obtained
from opportunity funds and REITs for joint ventures. The
future is uncertain and ever changing.
It should be clear that construction loans and equity
ventures are very risky, hazardous and complex investments.
Commercial banks, with their centuries of experience, their
regional relationships, are still well positioned to make
these investments, even if their level of commitment to
construction lending is less than it was. Still,
competition for the profits from these loans, especially
given the vast opportunities to sell them, has once again
made commercial bankers a bit too ravenous. "The banks,"
according to Jerry Ward, "Are going to screw it up again.""
Despite the higher cash equity requirements of the banks,
developers can still find ways of generating high investment
returns while lessening risk. The FHA, with its various
programs for housing and special interest groups, will
continue to be an excellent patsy in this regard. As the
least rational and most backward-looking investors of the
bunch, the officials of the federal government stand to be
really taken advantage of by creative developers.
For those willing to pay the interest price or attempting
projects with special risks and circumstances, Wall Street
is an excellent source of project debt. Never-the-less, the
Wall Street firms, note well, are the S&Ls of today. With
their three times overvalued REITs, with their opportunity
funds beginning to accept project IRRs of less than 18%,
Wall Street will be at the proverbial barber shop when the
next down of the real estate cycle arrives. Although some
have claimed that the public investor is more forward
looking and rational than the private, the Wall Street
"analysts" on whom these investors rely are just as backward
looking and irrational in other ways, as the insurance
companies of the 1980s. Finally, some of the CMBSs in the
market place will certainly experience default problems in
the imminent cycle, and now with the loan service agent
9 Lecture given by Jerry Ward, "Financing the Construction of the Fleet
Center," Cambridge, MA, December 1997.
(Wall Street or conduit) separated from the holder of the
debt, will there be a serious principal agent problem?
Meanwhile, there is always the possibility of the FACIT.
As for the REITs, they are certainly good buyers and
managers of real estate assets, but they are ill-suited to
develop. They are excellent joint venture equity partners.
For those who desperately wish to develop real estate as a
public company, a REOC, C-corporation is the best way.
In the opinion of this author, the optimal alternative
source of construction financing is equity partnership.
Banks still represent a good source of debt for the first
60-70% of capital. For the rest, a smart developer should
cultivate relationships with a small variety of equity
investors. This variety should include at least one REIT,
one opportunity fund and one foreign investor. Hopefully
this will help defray the problems associated with the
opportunistic supply of capital, the national real estate
market, and the builder's cost of capital in general. In
this way the builder can obtain money from sources with much
lower investment hurdle rates than his own, and occasionally
include some outside expertise when needed.
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